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The territorial effect of the right to be forgotten
after Google v CNIL
P.T.J. (PIETER) WOLTERS*
A B S T R A C T
In Google v CNIL, the Court of Justice has ruled that the right to be forgotten does not
compel a search engine to delist a website in its non-European versions. At first sight,
Google v CNIL therefore seriously undermines the effectiveness of the right to be
forgotten. However, further analysis reveals that this conclusion is premature. First,
the effectiveness depends on the requirements on the measures to prevent or at least
seriously discourage users in the European Union from accessing the delisted website
through a search with the name of the data subject as a search criterion. Next, the
effectiveness of the right to be forgotten depends on the requirements of national
standards of protection of fundamental rights. The GDPR does not prohibit member
states from ordering search engines to also delist a website in non-European versions.
K E Y W O R D S : GDPR, Right to be forgotten, fundamental rights
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The World Wide Web has a global character.1 For example, an ‘American’ website is
not only available in the USA, but also in the rest of the world. Its content is not ne-
cessarily restricted to American issues. For example, it could also contain information
about the citizens of the European Union. This global character raises questions
regarding the territorial effect of data protection law and other legal rules.2
Google Spain shows that the ‘right to be forgotten’ in the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) can be used to compel a search engine to remove a website
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1 As will be discussed in the sections ‘The Effectiveness of Geo-Blocking’ and ‘Additional Measures’, ‘Geo-
blocking’ and censorship can cause fragmentation by blocking access to certain websites based on the loca-
tion of the user. See eg Jakub Dalek and others, ‘A Method for Identifying and Confirming the Use of
URL Filtering Products for Censorship’ in IMC ’13 Proceedings of the 2013 conference on Internet measure-
ment conference (ACM 2013), 23; Allison McDonald and others, ‘403 Forbidden: A Global View of CDN
Geoblocking’ in IMC’18. Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference (ACM 2018), 218.
2 eg Paul de Hert and Michal Czerniawski, ‘Expanding the European Data Protection Scope Beyond
Territory: Article 3 of the General Data Protection Regulation in its Wider Context’ (2016) 6 IDPL 230,
230.
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from the list of search results.3 The effectiveness of this right depends in part on its
‘territorial effect’ or ‘scope’.4 The right is less effective if the delisted website can still
be found by using a non-European search engine. This is particularly important be-
cause search engines like Google operate a separate version for each country.5
In Google v CNIL,6 the (French) Conseil d’État raised the question whether the
European right to be forgotten can compel a search engine to remove a search result
from its non-European versions. The Court of Justice answered this question in the
negative. However, a search engine can be obligated to take measures that effectively
prevent or seriously discourage internet users within the European Union from
accessing the delisted website trough a non-European version.
In this article, I answer the following research question: ‘To what extent does the
right to be forgotten after Google v CNIL adequately prevent users from accessing a
website from within the European Union?’ The answer to this question requires a
clear understanding of the right to be forgotten and the territorial scope of the
GDPR. This article therefore starts with a brief description of the right to be forgot-
ten (the section ‘The Right to be Forgotten and Search Engines’) and the territorial
scope of the GDPR (the section ‘The Territorial Scope of the GDPR’). Next, I will
analyse the territorial scope of the right to be forgotten. This issue was first
addressed in Google Spain (the section ‘Google Spain’), in which the Court of Justice
ruled that data protection law and the right to be forgotten apply to (international)
search engines on the basis of the establishment criterion. This ruling concerns the
Data Protection Directive. It therefore does not discuss the targeting criterion of the
GDPR. However, the extensive interpretation of the Court of Justice suggests that
data protection law could also apply on the basis of the targeting criterion of the
GDPR (the section ‘The Right to be Forgotten and the Targeting Criterion’).
Whereas Google Spain shows that data protection law applies to search engines,
Google v CNIL also clarifies the territorial effect of the right to be forgotten itself
(the section ‘Google v CNIL’). The Court of Justice ruled that a search engine is not
obligated to remove a search result from its non-European versions, but that it can
have an obligation to take measures to prevent European users from accessing the
delisted website through the search engine. In practice, these measures primarily con-
sist of geo-blocking. However, the section ‘The effectiveness of geo-blocking’ shows
that geo-blocking by itself is not sufficiently effective to adequately prevent users
from accessing the delisted website from within the European Union. The section
‘Additional measures’ discusses some of the additional measures that can be taken.
Next, I will address the question whether a ‘global’ right to be forgotten can also be
3 Case C-131/12 Google Spain [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317; Regulation 2016/679/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (‘GDPR’) [2016] OJ L119/1.
4 For a discussion about other aspects of the effectiveness of this right, see eg TFE Tjong Tjin Tai, ‘The
Right to be Forgotten – Private Law Enforcement’ (2016) 30 International Review of Law, Computers &
Technology 76. See also the limitations of the right, discussed in the section ‘The Right to be Forgotten
and Search Engines’.
5 This issue is not restricted to search engines. Other websites such as weblogs are also offered in different
versions. For example, see Hof ’s-Hertogenbosch 6 October 2015, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2015:3904 about
the question whether a Dutch court can obligate a weblog to remove content from all versions.
6 Case C-507/17 Google v CNIL [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:772.
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based on national law (the section ‘National Standards of Protection of Fundamental
Rights’). In this light, I will also compare Google v CNIL with Glawischnig-Piesczek v
Facebook (the section ‘Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook’). Although these cases con-
cern different European rules, both give a large measure of discretionary power to
the member. They therefore provide insight in the way European law and the Court
of Justice deal with the problems that arise from the global nature of the internet. I
end with a conclusion (the section ‘Conclusion’). At first sight, Google v CNIL ser-
iously undermines the effectiveness of the right to be forgotten.7 However, a more
thorough analysis shows that the judgement does not necessarily lead to this result.
This article analyses the right to be forgotten under the GDPR. In contrast, the
requests for preliminary rulings in Google Spain and Google v CNIL concern the pre-
decessor of the GDPR, the ‘Data Protection Directive’.8 However, the Data
Protection Directive and GDPR approach the right to be forgotten in a similar way.9
Moreover, the European Court of Justice also examines the questions in Google v
CNIL in the light of the GDPR.10 For these reasons, Google Spain and Google v
CNIL remain relevant under the GDPR. I will therefore only pay limited attention to
the Data Protection Directive.
T H E R I G H T T O B E F O R G O T T E N A N D S E A R C H E N G I N E S
On 2 December 2019, the European Data Protection Board (the ‘EDPB’) published
guidelines on the criteria of the right to be forgotten in search engine cases. These
guidelines are provisional. The public was able to submit comments until 5 February
2020. The EDPB has only published ‘part 1’ of the guidelines. This part deals with
the grounds for the exercise of the right to be forgotten and the exceptions to this
right. It does not address Google v CNIL or the territorial effect.11
Articles 17 and 21 GDPR provide the legal basis for the right to be forgotten.12 In
Google Spain, the Court of Justice ruled that the ‘data subject’ can use this right to
7 eg Leo Kelion, ‘Google Wins Landmark Right to be Forgotten Case’ (BBC, 24 September 2019) <www.
bbc.com/news/technology-49808208> (accessed 6 May 2020); Enrique Dans, ‘It’s Time To Forget The
Right To Be Forgotten’ (Forbes, 25 September 2019) <www.forbes.com/sites/enriquedans/2019/09/
25/its-time-to-forget-the-right-to-be-forgotten> (accessed 6 May 2020); Phil Muncaster, ‘Experts
Question ECJ’s Right to be Forgotten Ruling’ (Infosecurity Magazine 25 September 2019) <www.infose
curity-magazine.com/news/experts-question-ecjs-right-to-be/> (accessed 6 May 2020); Nicole Lindsey,
‘EU Court Rules Google Does Not Have to Apply ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Globally’ (CPOMagazine 7
October 2019) <www.cpomagazine.com/data-privacy/eu-court-rules-google-does-not-have-to-apply-
right-to-be-forgotten-globally/> (accessed 6 May 2020).
8 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protec-
tion of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data
[1995] OJ L281/31; GDPR, art 94.
9 PTJ Wolters, ‘The Control by and Rights of the Data Subject Under the GDPR’ (2018) 22 Journal of
Internet Law 1, 9; n 10.
10 Case C-507/17 Google v CNIL [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, para 41. See also Case C-136/17 GC and
others [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:773, para 33, where the Court of Justice takes the GDPR into account in
the analysis of the questions.
11 European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 5/2019 on the criteria of the Right to be Forgotten in the search
engines cases under the GDPR (part 1) (Version for public consultation, 2019). About the EDPB, see also
GDPR, art 68. For the (general) guidelines about the territorial scope, see n 23.
12 Case C-136/17 GC and others [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:773, para 65; European Data Protection Board
(n 11) 3–4.
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compel a search engine to remove a website from the list of search results. This
judgement can be understood as follows. A website of a third party may contain ‘per-
sonal data’. A search engine that indexes this website, temporarily stores it and makes
it available to internet users in a particular order ‘processes’ these personal data and
determines the purposes and means of this processing. It is therefore a ‘controller’.13
Figure 1 provides an overview of this judgement.
The processing by Google may be permitted under Article 6(1)(f) GDPR on the
basis of a ‘legitimate interest’. This interest is not limited to the economic interests
of Google. It primarily consists of the right to freedom of information of internet
users.14 However, the data subject has the right to object to this processing on
grounds relating to his or her particular situation. If this objection is successful, the
search engine must remove the website from the list of search results that is dis-
played when a user enters, as a general rule,15 the data subject’s name as a search
criterion.16
The right to be forgotten has several important limitations. First, the delisting
does not remove the personal data from the website of the third party.17
Figure 1. Google Spain
13 Case C-131/12 Google Spain [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, paras 40–41. See GDPR, art 4(1), (2), (7)
for the definitions of the concepts used in this paragraph.
14 Case C-131/12 Google Spain [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, paras 73, 80. The Court of Justice does not
explicitly declare that these interests justify the processing by the search engine. However, the ruling that
Google is obligated to delist a website after receiving an objection on grounds relating to the particular
situation of the data subject suggests that the processing is generally allowed as long as the right to be for-
gotten has not been exercised.
15 The EDPB states that the website should be delisted for queries that include ‘as a main rule’, ‘as a general
rule’ or ‘in principle’ the data subject’s name and that the right to be forgotten is ‘mainly based’ on this
name. European Data Protection Board (n 11) 4, 6. It thus implies that the right to be forgotten could
also be extended to other search queries if this is necessary to ensure effective protection against the ‘sig-
nificant’ and ‘additional’ activity of a search engine. cf Case C-131/12 Google Spain [2014]
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 38.
16 GDPR, arts 17(1)(c), 21(1); Case C-131/12 Google Spain [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, paras 75, 76.
See also Case C-136/17 GC and others [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:773, paras 64–65. About the right to ob-
ject, see GDPR, art 21(1); Wolters (n 9) 11–12.
17 Case C-131/12 Google Spain [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, para 88.
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Furthermore, the website is not removed from the index and cache of the search en-
gine. The website can therefore still be found by entering a different search criterion.
A data subject could also invoke Article 17 GDPR to have his or her personal data
removed from the index and cache. This more extensive right exists in situations that
deviate from the typical applications of the right to be forgotten.18 It is not further
discussed in this article. Finally, the exercise of the right to be forgotten does not en-
sure that a website is removed by all search engines. A data subject must exercise his
or her right against each search engine separately.19
The success of the exercise of the right to be forgotten depends on the balance
between the internet users’ right to freedom of information and the data subject’s
rights to respect for private life and the protection of personal data.20 As a general
rule, the data subject’s fundamental rights take precedence. However, internet users’
right to freedom of information may outweigh these fundamental rights in specific
cases, in particular on the basis of the role of the data subject in public life.21
If the website contains special categories of personal data referred to in Article 9
GDPR, the search engine can only refuse the request for delisting if the inclusion of
the website is strictly necessary for the protection of the freedom of information. The
processing of these special categories of personal data is only permitted if there is a
‘substantial public interest’.22
T H E T E R R I T O R I A L S C O P E O F T H E G D P R
Article 3 GDPR provides the territorial scope of the GDPR. The EDPB has clarified
and interpreted this provision in the guidelines published on 12 November 2019.23
First, the GDPR may apply on the basis of the location of the controller or processor.
Article 3(1) GDPR provides the ‘establishment criterion’. The GDPR applies if the
controller or processor processes personal data in the context of the activities of an
establishment in the European Union. An ‘establishment’ exists if there is an effective
and real exercise of activities through stable arrangements. This threshold is low.
Even minimal activities by a single employee may be sufficient.24 However, the mere
availability of the controller’s website is not.25
The GDPR only applies if the processing takes place in the context of the activ-
ities of this establishment. This requirement must not be interpreted restrictively.
18 European Data Protection Board (n 11) 4.
19 cf GDPR, art 19. A controller must communicate any delisting to recipients to whom the personal data
have been disclosed. However, such an obligation does not exist in relation to competing search engines
that perform separate indexing activities.
20 As protected by Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391, arts 7, 8.
21 GDPR, art 17(3)(a); Case C-131/12 Google Spain [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, paras 69, 81; Case C-
136/17 GC and others [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:773, paras 53, 66, 69; European Data Protection Board
(n 11) 7–8, 10–11.
22 GDPR, art 9(2)(g); Case C-136/17 GC and others [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:773, para 61, 68–69, 75.
23 European Data Protection Board, Guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR (Article 3).
Version 2.0 (Version after public consultation, 2019). For a discussion of the territorial scope, see also De
Hert and Czerniawski (n 2).
24 GDPR, recital 22; Case C-230/14 Weltimmo [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:639; European Data Protection
Board, ibid 6.
25 Case C-191/15 Verein für Konsumenteninformation [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:612, para 76; European Data
Protection Board (n 23) 7.
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The GDPR is intended to ensure effective and complete protection. It should not be
possible to circumvent the applicability of data protection law.26 It is therefore not
required that the actual processing takes place in the European Union. The GDPR
also applies if the processing in the context of the European establishment is done by
an office or processor outside of the European Union.27
Article 3(3) GDPR extends the establishment criterion. The GDPR also applies
to a controller, but not a processer, that is established in a place where member state
law applies by virtue of public international law. For example, it also applies to a con-
sulate of a member state or a ship in international waters that is registered in the
European Union.28
The GDPR may also apply on the basis of the location of the data subjects. Article
3(2) GDPR provides the ‘targeting criterion’. The GDPR applies to the processing
of personal data of data subjects who are located within the European Union,29 even
if the controller or processor does not have a European establishment.30 However,
this criterion only applies if the processing is related to the activities referred to in
subparagraphs (a) and (b).
Pursuant to Article 3(2)(a), the GDPR applies if the processing is related to the
offering of goods or services to data subjects within the European Union. A payment
by the data subject is not necessary. ‘Information society services’ with a different
revenue model may therefore also fall under this criterion.31 The controller or pro-
cessor must have the intention to offer goods or services to data subjects within the
European Union. This intention may become apparent through circumstances such
as the fact that goods can be delivered in the European Union, the option to pay in
Euros or advertisements that are aimed at European data subjects. The mere avail-
ability of a website is again insufficient.32
Pursuant to Article 3(2)(b), the GDPR also applies if the processing is related to
the monitoring of behaviour within the European Union. This includes ‘profiling’ by
tracking a data subject on the internet.33 However, the GDPR does not cover an inci-
dental processing without an objective to monitor.34
In contrast to the establishment criterion, the targeting criterion was not included
in the Data Protection Directive. It is therefore not discussed in Google Spain and
Google v CNIL. Instead, Article 4(1)(c) of the Data Protection Directive states that
26 Case C-230/14 Weltimmo [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:639, paras 25, 30; European Data Protection Board
(n 23) 7–9; De Hert and Czerniawski (n 2) 234–35; n 44.
27 See also European Data Protection Board (n 23) 9–11.
28 ibid 22–23.
29 They do not have to be European citizens. GDPR, recital 14; European Data Protection Board (n 23)
14–15.
30 European Data Protection Board (n 23) 13.
31 Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying
down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on
Information Society services (codification) [2015] OJ L241/1, art 1(1)(b); European Data Protection
Board (n 23) 16. The supplier of the service may earn income by displaying personalised advertisements,
which could trigger GDPR, art 3(2)(b). n 33.
32 GDPR, recital 23; European Data Protection Board (n 23) 17–18.
33 GDPR, recital 24; European Data Protection Board (n 23) 15, 19.
34 European Data Protection Board (n 23) 20.
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the Directive can also apply on the basis of the location of the equipment that is used
to process the personal data. This criterion is not included in the GDPR.35
G O O G L E S P A I N
Google has a subsidiary in Spain, ‘Google Spain’. This subsidiary is mainly concerned
with the sale of advertising space to companies in Spain. It does not perform activ-
ities that are directly related to the indexing, storing and making available of third-
party websites.36 It therefore does not carry out any processing that is affected by the
right to be forgotten.
However, the establishment criterion does not require that the processing is actu-
ally performed ‘by’ the establishment in the European Union. The GDPR also
applies if the processing is performed in the extensively interpreted context of the
activities of this establishment (the section ‘The Territorial Scope of the GDPR’).
The Court of Justice therefore rules that the processing of personal data for the
search engine service and the sale of advertising space by the Spanish subsidiary are
inextricably linked. The sale of advertising space makes the search engine economic-
ally profitable. At the same time, there would not be any advertising space to sell
without the search engine. After all, the display of search results is accompanied, on
the same page, by the display of advertisements.37
T H E R I G H T T O B E F O R G O T T E N A N D T H E T A R G E T I N G C R I T E R I O N
The preliminary ruling in Google Spain concerns the Data Protection Directive. The
targeting criterion of the GDPR is therefore not discussed (the section ‘The
Territorial Scope of the GDPR’). However, the extensive interpretation of the Court
of Justice suggests that, in the absence of an establishment in Spain, data protection
law could also apply on the basis of the targeting criterion of the GDPR.
Google has the intention to offer its search engine service to data subjects in the
European Union.38 This service requires the indexing, storing and making available
of third-party websites. Moreover, the inclusion of websites with information about
European data subjects is important to ensure that the search engine also leads to
relevant results for European users. For this reason, offering the search engine service
and processing personal data are inextricably linked. In his conclusion in Google
Spain, Advocate General Jääskinen therefore seems to assume that data protection
law would also apply to the search engine under the targeting criterion of the pro-
posal for the GDPR and that this result would be consistent with other European
provisions.39
35 For a comparison between the Data Protection Directive and the GDPR, see also European Data
Protection Board (n 23) 4, 6, 23; De Hert and Czerniawski (n 2); Merlin Gömann, ‘The New Territorial
Scope of EU Data Protection Law: Deconstructing a Revolutionary Achievement’ (2017) 54 CMLR 567.
36 Case C-131/12 Google Spain [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, paras 43, 46, 51.
37 Case C-131/12 Google Spain [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, paras 52–58. See also Case C-507/17 Google
v CNIL [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, paras 49–52.
38 This is evident from the European versions of the search engine. The sections ‘Introduction’, ‘Google v
Cnil’.
39 Case C-131/12 Google Spain [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, Opinion of AG Jääskinen [2013]
ECLI:EU:C:2013:424, para 56.
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A restrictive textual interpretation of Article 3(2)(a) of the GDPR would lead to a
different result. The English version is rather vague. It states that the GDPR applies
if the processing of personal data of European data subjects is related to the offering
of goods or services to ‘such’ data subjects. Other versions more clearly point to a re-
strictive approach. For example, the French and Dutch versions state that the GDPR
applies if the services are offered to ‘ces’ or ‘deze’ (¼ these) data subjects. These for-
mulations suggest that the GDPR only applies if the processed personal data relate
to the data subject to whom the service is offered. This is only indirectly the case
with personal data on a third-party website. The search engine is available to all
Europeans. The fact that it is also offered to the data subject is merely an unintended
and incidental consequence. It is therefore insufficient to trigger the targeting criter-
ion.40 Figure 2 provides an overview of this situation.
In contrast, the German version only requires that the services are offered to
‘betroffenen Personen’ (¼ data subjects). However, even this version shows that the
GDPR at least assumes that the person to whom the service is offered is the data sub-
ject whose data are processed. After all, he or she would not be a data subject
otherwise.
The guidelines by the EDPB do not provide clarity. The EDPB sets forth that
the GDPR applies if the personal data of European data subjects is processed ‘and’
the service is offered in the European Union. It does not explicitly link these
requirements.41 It declares that the product must be offered to ‘individuals’ or a
Figure 2. Targeting criterion and the right to be forgotten
40 cf European Data Protection Board (n 23) 15, 18, 20.
41 European Data Protection Board (n 23) 14. cf art 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 8/2010 on
applicable law (0836-02/10/EN WP 179, 2010) 31; art 29 Data Protection Working Party, Update of
Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law in light of the CJEU judgement in Google Spain (176/16/EN WP 179 up-
date, 2015) 2. The art 29 Data Protection Working Party states that data protection law should also apply
to a processing in the context of services that are explicitly offered to individuals within the European
Union and that Google Spain does not exclude the application of data protection law to a controller with-
out an establishment in the European Union. More recent opinions about the revision of data protection
law do not provide more clarity. art 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 01/2012 on the data pro-
tection reform proposals (00530/12/EN WP 191, 2012); art 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion
08/2012 providing further input on the data protection reform discussions (01574/12/EN WP 199, 2012).






/ijlit/article/29/1/57/6118444 by guest on 16 April 2021
‘person’ in the European Union, but also that the offer should be directed at a
‘data subject’.42
A restrictive textual interpretation of Article 3(2)(a) of the GDPR would lead to
the conclusion that the targeting criterion is not fulfilled. This would run counter to
the objectives of the GDPR. It enables a search engine to avoid the application of the
right to be forgotten by closing its European establishments.43 The decision in Google
Spain was partly based on the objective of ensuring effective and complete protection.44
This objective could outweigh the fact that the GDPR assumes or suggests that the per-
son to whom the service is offered is also the data subject whose data are processed.
The choice for a restrictive textual interpretation is therefore not self-evident.
G O O G L E V C N I L
Google Spain shows that data protection law applies to search engines. However, it does
not clarify the territorial effect of the right to be forgotten. After all, the activities of
Google are not limited to the European Union. It also offers its services to users in
other parts of the world. Google Spain does not answer the question whether European
law also compels Google to adjust the search results outside of the European Union.
In Google v CNIL, this issue is focused on the different versions of the search en-
gine. The French supervisory authority,45 the ‘Commission nationale de l’informa-
tique et des libertés’ (‘CNIL’), ordered Google to delist websites from all versions of
its search engine pursuant to the right to be forgotten. However, Google was only
willing to delist websites in the versions with European domain name extensions.46
Furthermore, it started to apply ‘geo-blocking’ to automatically redirect a European
user to the national version that corresponds to his or her location (the section ‘The
Effectiveness of Geo-blocking’).
The Conseil d’État assesses, and the Court of Justice presumes, that data protec-
tion law also applies to the non-European versions of the search engine. Although
the search results are different in each version, they are derived from common data-
bases and common indexing. Moreover, there are various connections between the
different versions. The different versions of the search engine therefore carry out a
single act of personal data processing that is inextricably linked to Google’s French
establishment.47 Next, the Court of Justice considers that access to the delisted web-
site by users outside of the European Union can also have immediate and substantial
42 European Data Protection Board (n 23) 15–19.
43 cf the section ‘The Territorial Scope of the GDPR’; n 26. Although it is unlikely that Google will take this
step, it could be a consideration for other search engines. They may decide not to open an establishment
inside the European Union. The GDPR would still apply to the processing of the personal data of the
users of those search engines.
44 Case C-131/12 Google Spain [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, paras 53–54.
45 See GDPR, arts 51–59 about the status, competence, tasks and powers of the supervisory authorities.
Ultimately though, the capabilities of the supervisory authorities do not depend on the GDPR but on na-
tional law. See also PTJ Wolters, ‘The Enforcement by the Data Subject under the GDPR’ (2019) 22
Journal of Internet Law 1, 23.
46 Case C-507/17 Google v CNIL [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, paras 30–31. eg <www.google.de>;
<www.google.fr>; <www.google.nl>.
47 Case C-507/17 Google v CNIL [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, paras 36–37, 52.
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effects on European data subjects.48 The European Union therefore has the compe-
tence to obligate the delisting in all versions.49
Still, the Court of Justice rules that the GDPR does not impose this obligation.50
This ruling is primarily based on the complications that a global right to be forgotten
would entail. After all, such a right would greatly increase the extraterritorial effect of
the GDPR.51 It would not only prevent search engines from offering their services to
users in the European Union (see also the sections ‘The Right to be Forgotten and
the Targeting Criterion’ and ‘The Effectiveness of Geo-blocking’), but also interfere
with their operations in other parts of the world. The Court of Justice therefore
emphasizes that numerous third states do not have the right to be forgotten or have
a different approach to this right.52 Moreover, data protection must be balanced
against other fundamental rights. This balance is likely to vary significantly around
the world.53 The GDPR does not clearly create a global right to be forgotten and
does not provide instruments and mechanisms to cooperate on such a right.54 In
principle, Google is obligated to delist the websites in all European versions.
However, this may be different in situations in which the interest of the public in
accessing information varies between member states.55
The judgement in Google v CNIL represents a pragmatic solution. It limits the
regulation of the (global) world wide web to websites that are specifically targeted to
users in the European Union. It therefore avoids undue encroachment of the ‘digital
sovereignty’ of other countries.56
At the same time, Google v CNIL does not provide a general and comprehensive
answer to the question whether and to what extent the GDPR has a global effect.
48 ibid, paras 54–57. See also Federico Fabbrini and Edoardo Celeste, ‘The Right to Be Forgotten in the Digital
Age: The Challenges of Data Protection Beyond Borders’ (2020) 21 German Law Journal S1 55, 64.
49 Case C-507/17 Google v CNIL [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, para 58; Constanza Manavello and Laura
Di Tecco,‘The Global Implications of the CJEU’s Ruling in Google ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Case’ (IP
Watchdog, 16 October 2019) <www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/10/16/global-implications-cjeus-ruling-goo
gle-right-forgotten-case/> accessed 6 May 2020.
50 Case C-507/17 Google v CNIL [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, para 64.
51 cf Manavello and Di Tecco (n 49) (‘political grounds’). About the complications of the extraterritorial ef-
fect of the GDPR, see also Dan Jerker B Svantesson, ‘Extraterritoriality and Targeting in EU Data Privacy
Law: The Weak Spot Undermining the Regulation’ (2015) 5 IDPL 226; Christopher Kuner,
‘Extraterritoriality and Regulation of International Data Transfers in EU Data Protection Law’ (2015) 5
IDPL 235; De Hert and Czerniawski (n 2) 239–42; Fabbrini and Celeste (n 48) 55–65.
52 Case C-507/17 Google v CNIL [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, para 59. See also para 38. Google appeals
to the principles of courtesy and non-interference of public international law. See also Mary Samonte,
‘Google v CNIL Case C-507/17: The Territorial Scope of the Right to be Forgotten Under EU Law’
(European law blog 29 October 2019) <https://europeanlawblog.eu/2019/10/29/google-v-cnil-case-c-
507-17-the-territorial-scope-of-the-right-to-be-forgotten-under-eu-law/> accessed 6 May 2020.
53 Case C-507/17 Google v CNIL [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, para 60. For comparisons with other coun-
tries, see eg Oskar J Gstrein, ‘The Judgment That Will Be Forgotten’ (Verfassungsblog, 25 September
2019) <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-judgment-that-will-be-forgotten/> accessed 6 May 2020 (noting
that the right exists in many jurisdictions); Manavello and Di Tecco (n 49) (USA); Andrew K Woods,
‘Three Things to Remember from Europe’s “Right to Be Forgotten” Decisions’ (Lawfare 1 October
2019) <https://www.lawfareblog.com/three-things-remember-europes-right-be-forgotten-decisions>
accessed 6 May 2020 (Canada); Fabbrini and Celeste (n 48) 55.
54 Case C-507/17 Google v CNIL [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, paras 61–63.
55 ibid paras 66–69.
56 Fabbrini and Celeste (n 48) 64.
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Most importantly, the ultimate rejection of an obligation to delist a website in all ver-
sions is accompanied by the insistence that the European Union does have the com-
petence to impose such an obligation. The Court of Justice does not reject any and
all application of the GDPR to these non-European versions, it only rejects the glo-
bal right to be forgotten.
Furthermore, the solution of Google v CNIL is limited to the context of inter-
national search engines with different national versions. It does not clarify whether a
global right to be forgotten exists in other situations. For example, Google v CNIL
does not address the situation in which a single version is used to target both
European and international users. The insistence on the applicability of the GDPR
and the competence to impose a global right to forgotten suggests that the Court of
Justice may impose an obligation to delist such a situation. After all, search engines
who wish to avoid this global interference can decide to offer different versions for
different parts of the world. In contrast, such an obligation may not exist for search
engines that do not target European users at all, especially when they do not have a
European establishment (see also the section ‘The Right to be Forgotten and the
Targeting Criterion’).
T H E E F F E C T I V E N E S S O F G E O - B L O C K I N G
The solution of Google v CNIL would not adequately protect data subjects if users
could simply circumvent the application of the right to be forgotten by using a non-
European version of a search engine. For this reason, the Court of Justice also
decided that, ‘if necessary’, the search engine must take measures that are ‘sufficiently
effective’ to ensure the effective protection of the fundamental rights of the data sub-
ject. The measures should prevent or at least seriously discourage users in the
European Union from accessing the delisted website through a search with the name
of the data subject as a search criterion.57
According to the Court of Justice, Google uses geo-blocking for this purpose. It
automatically redirects a user to the national version of the search engine that corre-
sponds to his or her location. This location is determined by the user’s IP address.58
For example, a user with a ‘Dutch’ IP address will be automatically redirected to
‘Google.nl’, even if it enters ‘.com’ or any other domain name extension. The user
therefore cannot find the delisted website through a search with the name of the
data subject as a search criterion. Figure 3 provides an overview of this solution.
The ruling of the Court of Justice is ‘technology neutral’. It prescribes ‘sufficiently
effective measures’, but not that these measures should consist of geo-blocking on
the basis of the user’s IP address. Moreover, it does not address the question whether
the measures of Google are sufficiently effective. This is for the referring court to
ascertain.59
57 Case C-507/17 Google v CNIL [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, para 70.
58 ibid, paras 32, 42–43.
59 ibid, para 71; Manavello and Di Tecco (n 49). In the conflict between Google and CNIL, the Conseil
d’État did not address this issue. Instead, it decided that CNIL lacked the power to order a global delist-
ing. Conseil d’État 27 March 2020, No 399922; the section ‘National Standards of Protection of
Fundamental Rights’.
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The effectiveness of geo-blocking depends on several factors. First, accuracy is im-
portant. Geo-blocking will not provide effective protection if Google mistakenly
determines that certain IP addresses belong to locations outside of the European
Union. This risk appears to be limited. Although geo-blocking is not always precise,
the country of the user is usually determined correctly.60 The location can be deter-
mined more precisely by using available Wi-Fi networks, GPS or the mobile phone
network.61 However, these techniques require the users to share their location with
Google. This is not necessary if the location is determined by using the IP address.
Figure 3. Geo-blocking
60 eg Ingmar Poese and others, ‘IP Geolocation Databases: Unreliable?’ (2011) 41 ACM SIGCOMM
Computer Communication Review 53; Manaf Gharaibeh and others, ‘A Look at Router Geolocation in
Public and Commercial Databases’ in IMC’17 Proceedings of the 2017 Internet Measurement Conference
(ACM 2017). The determination of the location could temporarily become less accurate due to the
switch from IPv4 to IPv6. Jan-Jelle Kester, ‘Comparing the Accuracy of IPv4 and IPv6 Geolocation
Databases’ (JJKester, 22 January 2016) <www.jjkester.nl/projects/geoip/> accessed 6 May 2020; Scott
Hogg, ‘Determining where you are using IPv6’ (Infoblox, 7 November 2017) <https://blogs.infoblox.
com/ipv6-coe/geolocation-with-ipv6/> accessed 6 May 2020; Jason Young, ‘Geolocation and Mobile
Data’ (Mobile Reading Data Exchange 6 March 2018) <https://tascha.github.io/Mobile-Reading-Data-
Exchange/2018/03/06/geolocation-and-mobile-data.html> accessed 6 May 2020.
61 eg art 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation services on smart mobile devices
(881/11/EN WP 185, 2011) 4–5; Anthony T Holdener III, HTML5 Geolocation (O’Reilly 2011) 7–12;
Anna Sainsbury, ‘Geolocation Basics’ (2013) 17 Gaming Law Review and Economics 33, 34–35. The lo-
cation can also be determined through profiling. eg if a user regularly searches for restaurants in New
York and creates a profile that lists ‘New York’ as the home address, Google could assume that he or she
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Next, the effectiveness depends on the possibilities to circumvent geo-blocking.
For example, this can be done by using a ‘proxy server’, ‘virtual private network’
(‘VPN’) or the ‘Tor’ web browser.62 These tools all function in a similar way.63 They
mask the IP address, and thus the location, of the user by routing internet traffic
through a non-European server. This causes Google to mistakenly determine that a
user is located outside of the European Union and thus include the delisted website
in the search results. These ‘circumvention tools’ are relatively easy to use, at least in
the European Union.64 They are also quite popular. About a quarter of the internet
users occasionally use a VPN.65 The chance that a European user accesses a delisted
website through a search engine is therefore not negligible.
This is especially important because the right to be forgotten only applies to tar-
geted searches. The right only obligates the search engine to delist the website when
the name of the data subject is used as a search criterion (the section ‘The Right to
be Forgotten and Search Engines’). In this scenario, a user made a conscious effort
to specifically search for information about the data subject. Performing such a
search with a VPN only requires limited additional effort. Moreover, the right to be
forgotten is quite popular. Since Google Spain, Google has delisted over 1.4 million
URLs.66 A user of a search engine can therefore know that there is a small but not
negligible chance that his ‘target’ has also used the right to be forgotten. For example,
recruiters could decide to always use a VPN when using the name of an applicant as
a search criterion. The effectiveness of geo-blocking is therefore limited. The effect-
iveness of the right to be forgotten falters in the scenarios where the data subject
needs it most.
Geo-blocking is therefore not ‘sufficiently effective’ and does ensure the ‘effective
protection’ of the data subject. The referring court should conclude that Google vio-
lates the right to be forgotten. The easiest way to remedy this violation is to delist
the website in all versions of the search engine. Through this ‘detour’, the right to be
forgotten may still have global effect.
is located outside of the European Union. However, this method is no longer accurate if the user subse-
quently goes on a vacation in Rome. For another example, see Massimo La Morgia and others,
‘Nationality and Geolocation-Based Profiling in the Dark(Web)’ IEEE Transactions on Services
Computing (online access) (using the time of activity and the language of the user to determine his or
her location).
62 See also n 7.
63 For a general description, see Hal Roberts and others, 2010 Circumvention Tool Usage Report (The
Berkman Center for Internet & Society 2010); Kirk A Duncan, Assessing the use of Social Media in a
Revolutionary Environment (Naval Postgraduate School 2013) 36–37. About Tor, see La Morgia and
others (n 61) 2.
64 The risks and barriers are larger in countries with more internet censorship. Duncan (n 63) 37–38. Even
so, the circumvention tools are especially popular in those countries. Yi Mou, Kevin Wu and David Atkin,
‘Understanding the use of Circumvention Tools to Bypass Online Censorship’ (2016) 18 New Media &
Society 837; n 65.
65 Oliva Valentine, ‘VPN Usage Across the World’ (Globalwebindex, 2 July 2018) <https://blog.globalwe
bindex.com/chart-of-the-day/vpn-usage-2018/> accessed 6 May 2020; J Clement, ‘Global VPN Usage
Reach 2018, by Region’ (statista, 22 July 2019) <www.statista.com/statistics/306955/vpn-proxy-server-
use-worldwide-by-region/> accessed 6 May 2020. Only 3% used a VPN or other circumvention tool in
2010. Roberts and others (n 63) 3.
66 <https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/> (1.450.380,accessed 6 May 2020).
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A D D I T I O N A L M E A S U R E S
Alternatively, Google could remedy a violation of the right to be forgotten by taking
additional measures. For example, the search engine could also ‘filter’ the delisted
websites from the search results when a user employs a VPN or other circumvention
tool. This solution works on another level than the currently used geo-blocking.
Instead of blocking access to other versions of the search engine, it blocks access to
individual search results. Such a solution could also be used by search engines and
other websites that do not have different national versions (see the section ‘Google v
CNIL’ ). Google could even choose to completely block the use of its search engine
by users that employ a circumvention tool.
These solutions have important disadvantages. First, Google must be able to reli-
ably discover and block the circumvention tools. This can be done by using various
techniques that are also used by companies such as Netflix and other streaming serv-
ices.67 However, they are not perfect.68 Ensuring their effectiveness would require
continuous investments. Nevertheless, there is no obligation to guarantee that the
measures work perfectly. Google v CNIL only requires that the measures are ‘suffi-
ciently effective’.
Next, these solutions can restrict the right to freedom of information, especially
when access to the search engine is completely blocked. Users in China and other
countries with more severe internet censorship need the circumvention tools to ac-
cess an uncensored search engine.69 The impact of filtered search results is more lim-
ited. Google could pair the filter with a message that some search results may have
been removed in accordance with the right to be forgotten.70 Under this solution, a
user outside of the European Union could find the delisted websites by searching
again without the circumvention tool.
This solution becomes more problematic if it is also applied to meet delisting
obligations of other countries. The European right to be forgotten primarily applies
to information that may be considered sensitive by an individual data subject but is
relatively unimportant for the society as a whole. In contrast, other countries may
67 eg Lucas Dixon, Thomas Ristenpart and Thomas Shrimpton, ‘Network Traffic Obfuscation and
Automated Internet Censorship’ (2016) 14 IEEE Security & Privacy 43, 44–49; Jon Watson, ‘How Easy
is it to Detect a VPN is being Used?’ (comparitech.com 29 November 2017) <www.comparitech.com/
blog/vpn-privacy/how-easy-is-it-to-detect-a-vpn/> accessed 6 May 2020; Darragh Delaney, ‘How to
Passively Detect VPN Clients on Your Network’ (Netfort 5 December 2017) <www.netfort.com/blog/de
tect-vpn-clients-network/> accessed 6 May 2020; n 69.
68 eg Paul Bischoff, ‘Best VPNs for Netflix: Get any version of Netflix anywhere’ (comparitech 2 March
2020) <www.comparitech.com/blog/vpn-privacy/netflix-vpn-unblock-proxy-error/> accessed 6 May
2020; n 69.
69 Daniel Anderson, ‘Splinternet Behind the Great Firewall of China’ (2012) 10[11] ACM Queue.
70 Google displays a similar message if results are deleted pursuant to the ‘US Digital Milennium Copyright
Act’. eg the search criterion ‘watch the avengers online’ (6 May 2020, my personal laptop, Firefox with
private browsing) was paired with the message ‘In response to multiple complaints that we received
under the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act, we have removed 7 results from this page. . . . ’. A com-
parable message was shown outside of the context of IP law with the censored Chinese version of
Google. Elliot D Cohen, Mass Surveillance and State Control. The Total Information Awareness Project
(Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 81.
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impose obligations to remove politically sensitive or otherwise important informa-
tion.71 The solution could thus expose the users of circumvention tools to the cen-
sorship of various countries. This also affects users in Europe and other counties
with a relatively high level of internet freedom. It will be more difficult for them to
exercise the right to freedom of information while retaining the (real or hypothetical)
‘right to anonymity’.72
N A T I O N A L S T A N D A R D S O F P R O T E C T I O N O F F U N D A M E N T A L
R I G H T S
In Google v CNIL, the Court of Justice rules that the GDPR does not create a global
right to be forgotten. However, neither does European law prohibit such a right. The
Court of Justice explicitly declares that national standards of protection of fundamen-
tal rights could still obligate a search engine to also delist a website in its non-
European versions.73 In the conflict between Google and CNIL, the Conseil d’État
has since decided that CNIL cannot order a global delisting in the absence of nation-
al legislation that grants this power. Furthermore, it stated that such an order would
require balancing the rights to data protection and freedom of information on a case-
by-case basis.74
The decision that European law does not prohibit a ‘national’ global right to be
forgotten raises several issues about the relationship between national and European
law. First, the objectives of the GDPR include the harmonization of data protection
law, the creation of a consistent level of protection and ensuring the free movement
of personal data.75 A national global right to be forgotten would undermine these
71 See also Fabbrini and Celeste (n 48) 64–65.
72 Note that this ‘right’ or principle is not discussed in Google v CNIL. About this right, see eg Council of
Europe, Committee of Ministers, Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet (28 May 2003),
principle 7; Jonathan Turley, ‘Registering Publius: The Supreme Court and the Right to Anonymity’ in
Roger Pilon and others (eds), Cato Supreme Court Review (Cato Institute 2002) 77–82; C Nicoll, JEJ
Prins and MJM van Dellen (eds), Digital Anonymity and the Law: Tensions and Dimensions (T.M.C. Asser
Press 2003); Paul de Hert, Bert-Jaap Koops and Ronald Leenes, ‘8. Conclusion’ in Bert-Jaap Koops,
Ronald Leenes and Paul de Hert (eds), Constitutional Rights and New Technologies (Tilburg Institute for
Law, Technology, and Society 2007) 160; art 19, Right to Online Anonymity (2015). Retaining anonymity
is not completely impossible. For example, a user could use a tool that hides his or her identity without
masking the country of origin. cf <www.startpage.com>. This search engine uses the search results of
Google, but does not process the personal data of its users. It only uses a country code, based on the IP
address, to adapt the search results to the country of the user. <https://support.startpage.com/index.
php?/Knowledgebase/Article/View/768/0/how-do-you-know-my-language-or-location-if-you-dont-
store-information-about-me> accessed 6 May 2020. This solution is not completely anonymous.
Startpage can still see the IP address of the user. Furthermore, this solution requires that Google trusts
the country code generated by Startpage. This is only possible if Startpage takes adequate measures
against the use of a VPN and other circumvention tools.
73 Case C-507/17 Google v CNIL [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, para 72; Woods (n 53).
74 Conseil d’État 27 March 2020, no 399922.
75 GDPR, art 1, recitals 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 53, 123, 166, 170; Viviane Reding, ‘The European Data
Protection Framework for the Twenty-first Century’ (2012) 2 IDPL 119, 121; Bart van der Sloot, ‘Do
Data Protection Rules Protect the Individual and Should They? An Assessment of the Proposed General
Data Protection Regulation’ (2014) 4 IDPL 307, 317; Paul de Hert and Vagelis Papakonstantinou, ‘The
New General Data Protection Regulation: Still a Sound System for the Protection of Individuals?’ (2016)
32 Computer Law & Security Review 179, 182; PTJ Wolters, ‘The Security of Personal Data under the
GDPR: A Harmonized Duty or a Shared Responsibility?’ (2017) 7 IDPL 165, 165.
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objectives.76 It would create differences in the level of protection between various
member states. By ruling that the GDPR does not prohibit such a national right, the
Court of Justice accepts that such differences could come into existence. Apparently,
the freedom to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights out-
weighs the exception to the harmonization of data protection law.77
Next, a global right to be forgotten leads to various complications (the section
‘Google v CNIL’). The Court of Justice does not address the question whether these
complications also affect a ‘national’ right to be forgotten. In fact, individual member
states may find them even harder to navigate. After all, the European Union has sev-
eral options to ensure the extraterritorial effect of its legal rules, including its data
protection law.78
For example, Article 44 GDPR states that transfers of personal data to third coun-
tries are only allowed under certain conditions. This allows the European
Commission to make demands on the protection of personal data before it decides
that a country provides an ‘adequate level of protection’.79 Furthermore, the
European Union can place demands on the protection of personal data in third
countries through the (approval of) codes of conduct, certification mechanisms and
binding corporate rules that are used by the controller to provide ‘appropriate safe-
guards’.80 Among other requirements, an adequate level of protection and appropri-
ate safeguards require that data subjects are able to enforce data protection law.81
Furthermore, the European Commission and supervisory authorities have a duty to
develop international cooperation mechanisms to facilitate the effective enforce-
ment of legislation for the protection of personal data.82 Through these instru-
ments, the European Union can enable the application of the European right to be
forgotten in third countries. Individual member states do not have these options,
76 See also Gstrein (n 53). cf Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para 29;
Case C-399/11 Melloni [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, para 60. In these judgements, the Court of Justice
ruled that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union does not preclude the application
of national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided
for by the Charter and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not compromised. In Google v
CNIL, the Court of Justice refers to these judgements. See also Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, art 53; Case C-469/17 Funke Medien [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:623, para 32; Case C-
516/17 Spiegel Online [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:625, para 21.
77 Of course, this is not the only exception to the harmonization. See eg GDPR, arts 6(2), 8(1), 9(4); Peter
Blume, ‘Will it be a Better World? The Proposed EU Data Protection Regulation’ (2012) 2 IDPL 130,
132–33; Simon Davies, ‘The Data Protection Regulation: A Triumph of Pragmatism over Principle?’
(2016) 2 EDPL 290, 294–96.
78 Kuner (n 51) 239–41; Christopher Kuner, ‘The Internet and the Global Reach of EU Law’ in Marise
Cremona and Joanne Scott (eds), EU Law Beyond EU Borders: The Extraterritorial Reach of EU Law
(OUP 2019) 124–27, 130–36: Joanne Scott, ‘The Global Reach of EU Law’ in Marise Cremona and
Joanne Scott (eds), EU Law Beyond EU Borders: The Extraterritorial Reach of EU Law (OUP 2019) 21–
63; Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World (OUP 2020) ch 5;
Fabbrini and Celeste (n 48) 64–65.
79 GDPR, art 45(1), 4. See also Kuner (n 78) 124–25.
80 GDPR, art 46. See also Kuner (n 78) 125–26.
81 See eg GDPR, arts 45(2)(a), (b), 46(1), (3)(b), 47(1)(b), (2)(e), recitals 104, 108; art 29 Data
Protection Working Party, Adequacy Referential (18/EN WP 254 rev.01, 2018), ch 3, A8, C; art 29 Data
Protection Working Party, Working Document setting up a table with the elements and principles to be found
in Binding Corporate Rules (18/EN WP 256 rev.01 2018) 6–7.
82 GDPR, art 50(a). See also GDPR, art 45(5), (6).
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or only to a limited extent. The enforcement of a national global right to be forgot-
ten may therefore be even more problematic than the enforcement of a (hypothet-
ical) European right.
G L A W I S C H N I G - P I E S C Z E K V F A C E B O O K
In Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook,83 the Court of Justice arrives at a result that is
similar to Google v CNIL. The ‘e-Commerce Directive’ limits the liability of certain
online intermediaries.84 Article 15 provides that the member states are not allowed
to impose a general obligation to monitor on providers of ‘mere conduit’, ‘caching’
and ‘hosting’ services. However, the Court of Justice rules that a hosting service pro-
vider such as Facebook85 can be ordered to remove or block information that is iden-
tical or equivalent to information that was previously declared to be unlawful.
Furthermore, the Court of Justice rules that the e-Commerce Directive does not
provide for any territorial limitation on the scope of the measures that the member
states are entitled to adopt. A member state is therefore allowed to order the pro-
vider of a hosting service to remove or block the information globally.86 Although
the Court of Justice states that such orders should stay within the framework of rele-
vant international law, it does not clarify what rules are involved and to what extent
these rules limit the admissibility of the order. It only refers to recitals 58 and 60 of
the e-Commerce Directive.87 These recitals do not provide clarity. They merely state
in general terms that the directive is without prejudice to the results of discussions
within international organizations such as WTO, OECD and UNCITRAL.
There are clear differences between the GDPR and the e-Commerce Directive.
The GDPR imposes extensive obligations while the e-Commerce Directive prohibits
the member states from imposing obligations.88 Nevertheless, the result is the
same.89 European law does not impose an obligation to censor the internet globally,
but it does not prohibit national law from doing so either. Moreover, the Court of
Justice only provides very limited guidance about the complications that such an ex-
tensive territorial effect can entail (see also the section ‘Google v CNIL’).
With the ‘Digital Single Market’ strategy and the priority ‘A Europe fit for the
digital age’, the European Commission is strongly committed to a European
83 Case C-18/18 Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:821.
84 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000]
OJ L178/1; n 88.
85 Case C-18/18 Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, para 22.
86 ibid, paras 49–50.
87 ibid, paras 51–52; Lorna Woods, ‘Facebook’s Liability for Defamatory Posts: The CJEU Interprets the e-
commerce Directive’ (EU Law Analysis, 7 October 2019) <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/10/
facebooks-liability-for-defamatory.html> accessed 6 May 2020.
88 This contrast should not be generalized. eg the e-Commerce Directive imposes duties to provide informa-
tion. e-Commerce Directive, arts 5, 6, 7. The GDPR is also intended to guarantee the free movement of
personal data and therefore prohibits member states from imposing additional obligations. n 75.
89 cf Fabbrini and Celeste (n 48) 62, who claim that Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook ‘counter-balances’ the
limitation of extraterritorial effect in Google v CNIL. However, the apparent contrast between these judge-
ments results from the discussed differences between the GDPR (imposing certain obligations) and e-
Commerce Directive (prohibiting member states from imposing certain obligations).
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approach to digitalization.90 At the same time, Google v CNIL and Glawischnig-
Piesczek v Facebook show that European law does not yet provide a satisfactory solu-
tion to issues in relation to digitalization and extraterritoral effect.91 In both cases,
the Court of Justice refuses to give a unambiguous answer about the territorial effect
of European law. Instead, it gives a large measure of discretionary power to the mem-
ber states. The similarity of these cases suggests that the same result may also apply
to other legal norms, other digital services92 and (more general) other problems that
arise from the global nature of the internet.
C O N C L U S I O N
In this article, I answer the following research question: ‘To what extent does the
right to be forgotten after Google v CNIL adequately prevent users from accessing a
website from within the European Union?’ In accordance with the principles of the
GDPR, the territorial effect of the right to be forgotten should not be construed too
restrictively (the sections The Territorial Scope of the GDPR’, Google Spain and
‘The Right to be Forgotten and the Targeting Criterion’). In Google v CNIL, the
Court of Justice therefore presumes that the GDPR also applies to the non-
European versions of the search engine. However, the right to be forgotten does not
compel the search engine to delist a website in these versions (the section ‘Google v
CNIL’). At first sight, Google v CNIL therefore turns the right to be forgotten in a
paper tiger.93 However, further analysis reveals that this conclusion is premature.
First, much depends on the requirements on the measures to prevent or at least
seriously discourage users in the European Union from accessing the delisted web-
site. The Court of Justice does not address the question whether Google’s measures
are ‘sufficiently effective’. This is for the referring court to ascertain. Geo-blocking
can be circumvented quite easily. If the measure is nevertheless considered to be suf-
ficiently effective, the right to be forgotten will not adequately prevent users from
accessing the delisted website from within the European Union. After all, for a user
who specifically searches for information about a data subject, the use of a VPN or
other circumvention tool only requires limited additional effort (the section ‘The
Effectiveness of Geo-blocking’ ). However, the requirement that the measures are
‘sufficiently effective’ could also impose an obligation to take more effective addition-
al measures (the section ‘Additional Measures’).
Furthermore, the requirements of national standards of protection of fundamental
rights can also prevent users from accessing the delisted website. The GDPR does
not prohibit member states from ordering search engines to also delist a website in
non-European versions. Such a national enhancement of the right to be forgotten
can improve the protection of the data subject but may not be easy to enforce (the
90 Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ (Communication) COM (2015) 192 final;
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en>; <https://ec.europa.eu/info/priorities/europe-fit-digit
al-age_en>. Both websites accessed on 6 May 2020.
91 Gstrein (n 53); Woods (n 87). See also Kuner (n 78) 139–40, 145.
92 The dictum of Google v CNIL is limited to search engines. See also the section ‘The Right to be
Forgotten and the Targeting Criterion’. In contrast, the dictum of Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook is for-
mulated to apply to all types of hosting services, and not just social media.
93 n 7.
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section ‘National Standards of Protection of Fundamental Rights’). It remains to be
seen whether and to what extent the member states will try to impose such a ‘nation-
al’ global right to be forgotten, especially since the Court of Justice has not provided
any clear guidance about the complications of such a right. Moreover, Glawischnig-
Piesczek v Facebook shows that this issue is not limited to the right to be forgotten.
The same result also applies to other problems that arise from the global nature of
the internet (the section ‘Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook’).
The right to be forgotten is at a crossroads. Google v CNIL raises several
questions. The answers to these questions will determine whether the right to be
forgotten will adequately prevent users from accessing a website from within the
European Union and provide protection in a global World Wide Web. For this rea-
son, the effectiveness of the right to be forgotten can go either way.
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